Source: The Pen
Where we last left our wayward Supreme Court opinion writer, Alito
was using the Dictionary Act (a law) to justify a de facto
constitutional amendment (declaring all corporations to have the
rights of real people).
In response we heard from a number of right wing operatives,
protesting, “No, no, no, this is just about interpreting one law (the
so-called Religious Freedom Protection Act or RFPA), not about laying
down a broader constitutional doctrine.”
Horseradish . . . or maybe it’s bull radish.
On page 18 of the decision, Alito clearly embraces with both arms the
principle of “protecting the free-exercise (of religion) rights of
corporations.” Whoa, horsey. Stop it right there.
Corporations have NO such rights. What Alito has done here is argue
his case using his preordained conclusion as the sole evidence.
Anyone who thinks that Alito will not cite HIMSELF in his next
opinion, saying “In Hobby Lobby we found the corporations have this
constitutional right, and to be consistent with that we must now also
. . . ,” is a fool. We already told you the current rogue 5 member
majority is contriving a multi-decision chain of precedents here.
What the RFPA in fact does is create an exemption for an “eligible
organization” DEFINED as one that “holds itself out as a religious
organization,” which is to say one with that primary objective. Did
everyone just catch that fact that the RFPA goes out of its way to
articulate a much more LIMITED definition of “organization” than all
business entities of any kind?
As we pointed out last time, Alito’s bogus Dictionary Act argument
was that anytime “person” is used it must also include all manner of
corporations, even to the point of how to read the Constitution. His
argument is that all business entities are constitutionally equivalent
not only with each other, but with real people as well.
So what Alito has done here is blatantly disregard the limited
definition Congress intended, for dedicated religious organizations,
which Hobby Lobby clearly is not, and rule that the exemption must
also now extend more broadly to other business organizations not so
narrowly defined, if only their owners claim to have their own
personal religious beliefs. In short, either you’re a church or else
you are not.
To put it another way, even if you assume that Alito’s definitional
argument had any constitutional validity at all, the definition of
“eligible organization” in the Religious Freedom Protection Act
SUPERSEDES the broader definition in the Dictionary Act. He has
converted an expressly limited exemption into a wholly unintended
constitutional upheaval. Again, Alito cannot even properly read a law
as it defines itself, let alone be trusted to unilaterally amend the
constitution by judicial fiat.